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EUROPE: RECOVERING INTO A NEW REGIME

August 16, 2022  |  10 Minute Read


Samuel Finkelstein

Chief Investment Officer, Fixed Income and Liquidity Solutions

Samuel Finkelstein

Gurpreet Gill

Macro Strategist, Fixed Income and Liquidity Solutions

Gurpreet Gill


 

Key Takeaways

  • With inflation running at a 40-year high, monetary policy in Europe has entered a new era of positive rates which may attract flows into euro area fixed income.
  • Forecasting where euro area growth, inflation and rates will settle, though, remains difficult in the face of shifting policy priorities and interrelated structural forces, including aging demographics, changing migration patterns, digitization and higher energy prices.
  • We expect gradual normalization of euro area monetary policy and a reorienting of fiscal policy aimed at charting a greener and more equitable path to growth.

 


 

A Turn of Events

As recently as a year before the pandemic, there was a growing concern among policymakers and investors around the “Japanification” of Europe—a new version of Japan’s lost decade of low rates, low inflation and low growth. Despite years of ultra-accommodative monetary policy, euro area annual headline and core inflation averaged just 1.3% and 1.1% between 2009 and 2019. Core inflation missed the 2% goalpost for the entire period.1 The shortfall was attributed to global factors as well as European-specific ones such as free movement of labor and fiscal conservatism.

 

Three years later, headline inflation is running at the highest level in 40 years and core inflation has reached its highest point. A similarly sharp shift in the monetary policy outlook has followed. In late 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB) had dropped its policy rate deeper into negative territory with no end to quantitative easing (QE) in sight, and it extended the program’s time horizon as recently as 2021. Today, the ECB has ended QE and exited the negative interest rate policy that was adopted in 2014.2

 

Lifting interest rates out of negative territory is a momentous event for European fixed income markets, with implications for local and global investors. Together with structural reform, positive rates may reverse the outflows that European fixed income has experienced over the last eight years. But to value long term bonds and determine strategic asset allocations, investors need an idea of where European growth, inflation and rates will settle in the years to come. And that’s not easily answered given the uncertainties created by major geopolitical events like Brexit, the pandemic, and war in Ukraine, as well as a cross-current of five key interrelated structural forces. 

 

Higher Rates and Structural Reform May Reverse the Trend of Net Fixed Income Outflows

 

The introduction of negative rates in June 2014 led to an exodus from European fixed income. From 2000 through 2014, cumulative net inflows into Euro area fixed income assets totaled €1.0tn; since that time, cumulative net outflows have totaled €2.9tn, or 23% of Euro area GDP.

 

 

Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. As of May 2022. Gross domestic product (GDP).

 

Force 1: Aging Demographics and Migration Flows

Structural unemployment has been a long-standing feature of the euro area labor market. With an abundant supply of migrant labor from Eastern European countries, wage growth has been tepid. During the pandemic, short-term work schemes limited the rise in unemployment. Now, a dynamic recovery has pushed the euro area unemployment rate to an all-time low and lifted labor force participation to a record high, while key measures of wage growth—such as compensation per employee and the labor cost index—accelerated to decade highs in the first quarter of this year.


Two key structural factors may limit the extent to which the labor market deviates from the current cyclical tightness. First, Europe’s age pyramid is inverting due to consistently low birth rates and higher life expectancy. As the baby-boom generation retires in the coming decades, the pool of available workers will shrink, potentially creating an upward impetus for wages, a key determinant of medium-term inflation outcomes.

 

Second, firmer wage growth in Eastern European economies may moderate migration flows into the euro area in the coming years. Ten years ago, a Romanian worker looking for employment in the manufacturing sector could increase earnings tenfold by migrating to Germany.3 At the end of 2021, that wage advantage had more than halved. Given Germany’s economic prominence in the euro area, higher German wages, due to fewer migrant workers, could propel the broader region into a higher-wage environment.

 

That said, we believe there are several offsetting considerations. Aging demographics can also promote disinflation through higher savings and the downtrend in labor union membership that has contributed to muted wage growth is unlikely to reverse course. In addition, flexible work arrangements adopted during the pandemic may be disinflationary insofar as they expand labor force participation and boost productivity through reduced time and costs on commuting. Finally, over the longer term, legal migration pathways for refugees—from Ukraine and other countries—into the workforce could help to counter the economic impacts of aging populations.

 

Force 2: Accounting for Housing

The European inflation index’s housing weight—7%—is among the lowest across advanced economies and four times lower than that in the U.S. To better reflect the living cost of euro area households, the ECB said last year that the inflation measurement will be updated to include owner-occupied housing costs. Estimates suggest this will lift annual core inflation by 0.10% to 0.15% each year.4 Due to the cyclical nature of housing costs, housing’s entry into inflation statistics may speed up the responsiveness of inflation to the output gap, particularly core inflation.

 

However, it may take a decade before the change is made. There is also considerable uncertainty around medium-term housing demand and supply dynamics. In our view, housing’s inclusion into inflation statistics is likely to be a secondary consideration for the long-term inflation outlook relative to other key structural factors.

 

Force 3: A New Era of Energy Inflation

Developed market central banks typically look through supply shocks, such as higher energy prices, as their direct effect on inflation is assumed to be temporary. When the ECB departed from this playbook in 2008 and 2011, its rate hikes proved ineffective. But today, the rising presence of physical and transition climate risks and a surge in green investment suggests the conventional view may need updating. ECB Governing Board member Isabel Schnabel has highlighted three elements of energy-related inflation until Europe achieves affordable, clean and secure energy:

 

  1. Fossilflation: or higher fossil fuel prices, is a function of high demand and undersupply in fossil fuels due to years of underinvestment and war-related supply disruptions. The decarbonization agenda will preserve tight financing conditions for hydrocarbons, reducing supply and lifting prices.

  2. Climateflation: the costs incurred from climate events including food inflation which are expected to become more frequent and severe.

  3. Greenflation: has both a micro and macro element. At a micro level, greening the economy may push up prices for certain metals and minerals. At a macro level, the European Green Deal,5 the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) pandemic recovery package and the REPowerEU plan seek to boost energy security and advance the energy transition. The surge in climate-related investment may add up to a sizable 9% of euro area GDP, averaging almost 1% of GDP per year during 2021-2030. This green investment has potential to lift aggregate demand and in turn inflation. 
     

The inflation impact of green investment spending is complex and uncertain. It could be lessened if producers and consumers swiftly switch to green alternatives in response to policy incentives or higher prices. A boost to potential growth could also temper the inflationary impact. Overall, we see scope for higher energy-related inflation until carbonomics prevails, with technological innovation and the benefits of scale helping to flatten the decarbonization cost curve for clean technologies across almost all sectors.
 

A Green Investment Surge Could Lift the Level of Real GDP in Europe by About 2% In the Mid-2020s

 

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research European Economics Analyst, “The Costs and Opportunities of Climate Change.” As of May 10, 2022. Carbon Capture Storage (CSS)

 

Force 4: A Digital Tipping Point

Though Europe has historically lagged North America and Asia in the digitization of its economy, digital transition now appears to be a key European policy priority that will complement its energy transition. Policymakers are also focused on the concept of digital sovereignty—the ability to control the new digital technologies and their societal effects.6

 

At least 20% of the NGEU recovery fund will be spent on the digital transition, including expansion of broadband services alongside reskilling and upskilling of the workforce. Digital priorities coupled with green investments may improve economic outcomes in Europe along three dimensions: capital accumulation, employment expansion and productivity growth. We think the digital tipping point has potential to help Europe avoid climate tipping points, while potentially improving growth and taming inflation.

 

Force 5: Shifting Policy Priorities

The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have further entrenched green and digital ambitions in Europe. Conflict in the region has also led to a reset in foreign and security policy. Both shocks have already pushed policy boundaries into new realms. Extensive ECB bond buying has enlarged the central bank’s footprint in Italy’s bond market from 19% pre-pandemic to more than 33% today,7 leading to concerns about and fiscal dominance.

 

Looking ahead, we think inflation concerns due to policy actions may be calmed by a return to fiscal discipline and hawkish ECB policy, with the central bank adopting a “whatever it takes” tone on bringing inflation back to target at its July 2022 meeting. Importantly, though, fragmentation of the currency union remains a chronic issue that has been concealed by years of monetary stimulus. A rise in debt-servicing costs could interfere with the ECB’s rate-hiking path and put concerns about debt sustainability back into focus, particularly for high-debt member states such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

 

But it is in times of crisis that the ECB expands its toolbox and governments achieve fiscal coordination. The NGEU Recovery Fund provides a precedent for a Europe-wide fiscal response that can be used again during a future crisis,8 and the new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) could be a powerful tool in anchoring sovereign bond yields in Europe. That said, limited clarity on the conditions under which the TPI would be activated will likely preserve the risk of volatility in European bond markets, particularly during times of high political uncertainty. All told, we expect a gradual normalization of monetary policy in the euro area, which should help safeguard against fragmentation risk. We are also encouraged that the goal of E.U. fiscal policy, rather than simply seeking a cyclical boost to demand, has turned more structural in nature: to chart a greener, more equitable and digitized path to growth.

 

 

Recovering into a New Regime

A key question for investors is whether 2022 will mark a pivot point for European inflation, monetary policy and fixed income assets. We see three plausible scenarios:

 

  1. Reflation reset: Prolonged loose fiscal policies may dampen the impact on the economy from rising rates, allowing the labor market to tighten further and wage growth to pick up. Combined with a shrinking workforce, we would expect this to lead to higher inflation and rates.

  2. New normal: Europe may return to fiscal discipline as the impact of pandemic—and war-related supply shocks subside. Flexible work and reskilling could improve in labor force participation, keeping wage growth in check. But elements of energy inflation may persist, with both rates and inflation settling above pre-pandemic levels.

  3. Lowflation reprise: Excessive monetary tightening may cause growth and inflation to plunge, leading the ECB to embrace a low rate policy. But absent material downside inflation risks, we don’t expect negative rates to return.

 

In our view, the path likely runs between the “reflation reset” and “lowflation reprise” scenarios, with Europe entering a “new normal” of moderately higher inflation and interest rates relative to the last cycle. The move into a positive rate environment may attract more fixed income capital flows, supporting the euro over time9 and sponsoring a steeper European yield curve that would be supportive for the banking sector. The end of QE could also lead to greater differentiation in corporate bond performance, creating security selection opportunities for active managers. There is also potential for higher rates to attract interest from income-oriented investors, while structural reform focused on energy transition and digitization may offer attractive bottom-up corporate bond opportunities. Overall, we believe the recovery of Europe into a new regime has potential to stem—or even reverse—the trend of net fixed income outflows observed since 2014, but we’ll continue to observe if we are braced for a higher nominal growth and real rate environment. 

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1Macrobond, Goldman Sachs Asset Management.

2Although active QE has ended, the ECB will still be buying bonds as part of its reinvestment schedule which will be flexible in nature. It has also unveiled a new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) to address sovereign bond market stress.

3Eurostat. Based on hourly labor costs in euros.

4Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, “European Daily: Q&A — ECB Strategy Review and Owner-Occupied Housing.” As of July 13, 2021.

5The European Green Deal is a set of policy initiatives by the European Commission with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% versus 1990 levels by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050.

6As defined by the European Council on Foreign Relations.

7Macrobond, Goldman Sachs Asset Management. Based on ECB holdings as a proportion of outstanding Italian government debt in February 2020 and March 2022.

8This is because the Recovery Fund has set a legal precedent for using Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to issue debt for redistributive (grant) purposes.

9The euro also benefits from a healthy euro area current account position.


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Date of first use: August 16, 2022. 282039-OTU-1624986

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